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ARGUMENT
On appeal, Mr. Latham asks the Court to limit ORS' s Medicaid lien to the portion of
Mr. Latham's settlement that represents past medical expenses attributable to third-party
liability. Put more simply, Mr. Latham asks that ORS comply with plain meaning of the
@

Medicaid statutes and the U.S. Supreme Court's application of those statutes.
In its brief, ORS argues that it should not be obliged to determine the extent ofthirdparty liability; that Utah courts should ignore the proportionality formula applied in

Ahlborn, see Ark. Dep't ofHealth & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006); and
that even though ORS will not pay Mr. Latham' s future medical expenses, it can
nevertheless look to those expenses to maximize its recovery from Mr. Latham's settlement
funds. Without that latitude, ORS insists, the State's Medicaid system cannot stay afloat.
. But ORS fails to engage with the plain language of the controlling statutes, focusing
instead on its narrow (and incorrect) reading of Ahlborn and Was/Cansler. See E.MA. ex

rel. Plyler v. Cansler, 674 F.3d 290 (4th Cir. 2012); Wos v. E.MA. ex rel. Johnson, 568
U.S. 627 (2013). And, preoccupied by the parade of horribles that ORS insists will appear
if the Court accepts Mr. Latham's position, ORS ignores the realities of the State's
Medicaid recovery system. In short, not only does the law support Mr. Latham's position,
so too does sound public policy.

I.

ORS fails to acknowledge its statutory obligation to ascertain third-party
liability and to limit its recovery accordingly.
The anti-lien provisions contained in the federal Medicaid statutes recognize that

payments from third-party settlements are protected as the recipient's property. Only one
limited exception applies: state Medicaid agencies are free to pursue reimbursement from
those settlements, but only if they first "take all reasonable measures to ascertain the legal
liability of third parties ... to pay for care and services under the plan." 42 U.S.C.
~

§ 1396a(a)(25)(A). Once the agency ascertains the extent of third-party liability, the agency
may seek reimbursement for payments it has made-but only "to the extent of such [third-

~
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party] legal liability." See Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 275-76 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
I)

§ 1396a(a)(25)(A)-(B)).
That principle is the most glaring omission from ORS's brief. To justify its demand
for money out of Latham' s settlement, ORS must do more than show that Medicaid made
payments for Latham's medical care. Rather, ORS must ascertain whether-and to what

~

extent-the settling physician and hospital are liable for the payments Medicaid made on
Latham' s behalf, then limit its reimbursement to the extent of that legal liability. This is
ORS 's statutory burden-not Latham' s, and not a district court's-and any attempt by ORS
to recover from Latham' s settlement without first ascertaining third-party liability and
limiting its recovery accordingly is a violation of federal Medicaid law and the cases that
interpret it, including Ahlborn and Wos/Cansler. As explained in the sections below, ORS's
opposition brief fails to address the critical issues in this case: the limitations on recovery
imposed by federal Medicaid statutes, the recent legislative back-and-forth that reaffirmed
those limitations, and the implementation of those limitations by Ahlborn in 2006 andperhaps even more critically-by Was/Cansler in 2013.

A.

Recent congressional action demonstrates that the statutes applied in
Ahlborn and Wos/Cansler remain in effect today.

A recent legislative back-and-forth confirms that the federal statutes interpreted by
the Supreme Court in Ahlborn and Wos/Cansler remain in effect today. This reaffirmation
of long-standing statutes also confirms the recovery limitations that these statutes impose.
Almost five years ago, the 2013 Bipartisan Budget Agreement (BBA) indicated that
certain changes would be made to the federal Medicaid statutes at issue here. See
Resolution Making Continuing Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 113-67, § 202, 127 Stat. 1165,
1177 (2013). The table below highlights the most relevant changes:

2
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Post-2013 BBA

Pre-2013 BBA

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(B)
"A State plan for medfoal assistance
must . . . provide . . . that in any case
where [third-party] legal liability 1s
found to exist after medical assistance
has been made available on behalf of the
individual ... , the State or local agency
will seek reimbursement for such
assistance."

"A State plan for medical assistance
must . . . provide . . . that in any case
where [third-party] legal liability 1s
found to exist after medical assistance
has been made available on behalf of the
individual ... , the State or local agency
will seek reimbursement for such
assistance to the extent of such legal
liability." (Emphasis added.)

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(H)
"A State plan for medical assistance
must . . . provide . . . that to the extent
that payment has been made under the
State plan for medical assistance in• any
case where a third party has a legal
liability to make payment for such
assistance, the State has in effect laws
under which, to the extent that payment
has been made under the State plan for
medical assistance for health care items
or services furnished to an individual,
the State is considered to.have acquired
the rights of such individual to any
payments by such third party."
(Emphasis added.)

"A State plan for medical assistance
must . . . provide . . . that to the ·extent
that payment has been made under the
State plan for medical assistance in any
case where a third party has a legal
liability to make payment for such
assistance, the State has in effect laws
under which, to the extent that payment
has been made under the State plan for
medical assistance for health care items
or services furnished to an individual,
the State is considered to have acquired
the rights of such individual to payment
by any other party for such health
care items or services." (Emphasis
added.)

These changes were widely viewed as legislative attempts to alter the effects of Ahlborn
by lifting limitations placed on recovery by state Medicaid agencies.
These 2013 BBA changes were originally slated to come into effect on October 1,
2014. Id. On March 31, 2014, Congress delayed the effective date for these changes until
October 1, 2016. See Protecting Access to ·Medicare Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-93,
§ 211, 128 Stat. 1040, 1047. Congress later delayed the effective date again, this_time until

3
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October 1, 20.17. See Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No.
114-10, § 220, 129 Stat. 87, 154. Thus, while those changes had not yet come into effect
during the critical stages of this dispute, 1 it was widely assumed that the law had changed
as of October 1, 2017, and that future cases could therefore be affected by this amendment,
even if Mr. Latham' s was not.
But that's all changed. In a budget deal signed February 9, 2018, Congress fully

repealed the 2013 changes discussed above, and made its repeal retroactive to September
30, 2017. See Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-123, sec. 53102, 132 Stat.
64. The result of that repeal, then, is that the federal Medicaid statutes at issue must be
"applied and administered as if [the 2013] amendments had never been enacted." See id.
In effect, the "old regime" never changed, and remains the law today. 2 Of course, the
abandoned change tells us something else: if it was the intent of Congress to relieve state
Medicaid agencies of the recovery limitations imposed by Ahlborn, Congress has now
reversed course, scuttling the changes and reaffirming that state Medicaid agencies can
only recover from third-party settlements to the extent they abide by the limitations

Gj

contained in the governing statutes and applied by Ahlborn and Was/Cansler, as detailed
below.

1 That

is, the "old regime" was in effect when Mr. Latham·received medical care, when he
signed an agreement with ORS, when he reached a settlement with the hospital, when he
filed his Complaint against ORS, and when the district court reached its decision in this
case.
2

Because the brief window in which the law had presumably changed-from October 1,
2017, to February 9, 2018-overlapped with the appeal in this case, the version of the
federal Medicaid statutes that Mr. Latham attached to his opening brief is incorrect. Mr.
Latham has therefore attached to this reply a supplemental copy of the relevant portions of
those federal Medicaid statutes. These are the statutes that were in effect during the critical
junctures in this case-and these are the statutes that remain in effect today. See Supp.
Addendum.

4
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Ci)

B.

The implementing statutes require a state Medicaid agency to "ascertain
the legal liability of third parties"-and ORS should not be rewarded for
failing to do so.

Though Latham's opening brief carefully walked through the details of the federal
and state Medicaid-recovery schemes, see Appellant's Br. 17-21, ORS's brief scarcely
®)

responds to these arguments. And though this Court has expressed wariness about
"rush[ing] headlong" into the "nest of statutes" that make up Medicaid law, see S.S. ex rel.

Shaffer v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2018 UT 13, , 9, 417 P.3d 603, that "nest" can be
expressed as three straightforward principles:
( 1) The anti-lien provision. On its face, federal Medicaid statutes forbid states
from.imposing any lien "against property of an individual on account of
medical services rendered to him under a State plan" and from adjusting or
recovering "any medical . assistance correctly paid on behalf of an
individual." See Appellant's Br. 19-21; 42 U.S.C._§ 1396p.
(2) The exception to that provision: forced assignments ofMedicaid recipient's
recovery rights. At most, the "forced assignment" of recovery rights-the
type of assignment ORS relies upon here-operates as "an exception to the
anti-lien provision" described above. See Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 284; 42
U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(25), 1396k(a).
(3) The limitation placed on forced assignments. Even this exception has a
limitation. When state law does force a Medicaid recipient to assign
recovery rights to a state Medicaid agency like ORS, that assignment is
limited by federal law: state Medicaid agencies may "seek reimbursement
for medical assistance ... to the extent of the legal liability of third partfos
to pay for care and services under the plan." Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 280; see
also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(25)(B).
That third principle is critical, and it requires careful consideration. In effect, the
second limitation imports a tort concept-the concept of the "extent of a party's legal

liability"-into a statutory reimbursement scheme. Both in the district-court proceedings
below and in its appellee's brief, ORS failed to grapple with this tort concept. 3 But, as
explained below, the governing statutes do not permit OR$ to sidestep this determination.
3

In its brief, ORS insists that "Mr. Latham has not argued that an evidentiary hearing was
needed to determine how much of the settlement was for medical expenses." Appellee' s

5
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ORS does briefly acknowledge the significant burden it bears under federal Medicaid
law: as the designated Medicaid agency for a participating state, ORS must "ascertain the
legal liability of third parties ... to pay for [Medicaid] care and services." See Appellee's
Br. 4; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(A); Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 268. But ORS unduly
minimizes its obligation by suggesting that it needs only determine whether "[third-party]
legal liability ... exist[s]." See Appellee's Br. 4. This is flatly wrong. Because ORS is only
permitted to "seek reimbursement ... to the extent of such [third-party] legal .liability,"
ORS must ascertain not only whether a third party owes liability to pay for care and services
covered by Medicaid, but also how much liability a third party owes. See id. at 4; 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(25)(B).

C.

Ahlborn and Wos require a determination as to what portion of a settlement
represents payment for medical care.

As stated above, a state's Medicaid lien is limited to ( 1) the amount of medical
assistance the state rendered under Medicaid, and (2) the amount of medical assistance that
is attributable to third-party liability. It is these two cumulative limitations that makes the

Ahlborn formula so useful. Calculating the ratio of settlement amount divided by total
claim value (SA/TCV) satisfies the second limitation-i. e., it provides a proxy for third~
party liability. Multiplying that ratio by the past Medicaid costs (PMC) satisfies the first
limitation-i.e., it ensures that the state's recovery is limited to medical assistance the state .
rendered.

Br. 12. This is, at_ best, misleading. Mr. Latham didn't push for an evidentiary hearing
because there was a less-expensive, more-predictable alternative available: using the
Ahlborn formula to apportion the third-party settlement between categories. Mr. Latham's
preference for the less-expensive method of settlement apportionment doesn't amount to a
rejection of an evidentiary hearing. In any event, federal Medicaid law requires that the
apportionment happen somehow-and ORS' s failure to ascertain properly third-party
liability or ensure apportionment of the settlement is precisely what Mr. Latham
complained of below and addresses again now, on appeal.
6
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ORS's primary argument on appeal, it seems, is that Ahlborn does not require district
courts to use a formula or ratio to break a settlement into piec.es and determine what
"portion of the settlement ... represented payments for medical care." See Ahlborn, 547
U.S. at 27 5. This is undoubtedly true. Parties to a Medicaid-reimbursement dispute are free
~

to make that determination in a number of ways: they could stipulate to an apportionment
as part of a settlement agreement, for example, or they could ask the court to hear evidence
and make its own determination. But Ahlborn endorsed a third approach: a district court
could reasonably presume that the portion of the settlement attributable to payments for
medical care is equal to the portion of the total claim value attributable to payments for
medical care. See id. at 280-81 (emphasizing that the third party's liability to pay for
medical care "extends no further" than the "one-sixth [share]" implied by a $550,000

Ci

· settlement of a claim valued at $3,040,708.12).
In fact, the only approach that is clearly not permitted is the approach ORS implicitly
advocates: for a state Medicaid agency to charge forward and seek full recovery of every

<i

penny it expended on the Medicaid recipient's behalf, without either apportioning the
settlement or ascertaining third-party liability. In Wos, the Supreme Court rejected a North
Carolina recovery scheme that is modest compared to ORS's approach here. Under that
scheme, when ''the State's Medicaid.expenditures exceed one-third of a beneficiary's tort
recovery," one-third of the tort recovery would be "conclusively presumed" to represent
compensation for medical costs. Wos v. E.MA. ex rel. Johnson, 568 U.S. 627,635 (2013).
The Supreme Court rejected that statutory presumption, because it could lead to exactly

<i

the problem at issue here: in at least some cases, the·North Carolina statute would allow
the state Medicaid agency to "demand [a] portion of a beneficiary's tort recovery" that had
not been "attribut[ed] to-medical expenses." Id at 638. The Supreme Court held that the
Medicaid anti-lien provision preempted such a result.
ORS arrives at its full-recovery approach in a problematic manner. In one breath ORS
contends that "Ahlborn ... did not create, or follow, a formula," and in the next ORS asks

7
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the Court to do precisely that-to create and follow a formula. But ORS' s formula-which
the district court ultimately employed, see R00 160-168; Addendum to Appellant's
Opening Br., at A-26-finds no support in the federal statutes, in Ahlborn, or in

Wos/Cansler. ORS's own formula has two steps: divide total medical expenses by total
claim value {TME/TCV), and then multiply that ratio by the settlement amount (SA). But
this formula does nothing to ensure that ORS's lien complies with the narrow restrictions
imposed by federal law. The TME/TCV ratio simply determines the ratio of all medical
expenses to the total claim value-and the resulting figure thus has nothing to do with the
extent of third-party liability. And multiplying that ratio by the settlement amount (SA)
does not ensure that the lien is limited to "the extent of the legal liability of third parties to
pay for care and services under the plan." Even if the formula is rearranged to compare
settlement amount and the total claim value (SA/TCV), the formula still fails to ensure that
the second restriction is observed-limiting the lien to medical assistance actually rendered
by the state-because ORS' s formula multiplies the SA/TCV ratio by not only past but
also future medical expenses. All that ORS's formula does is ensure that ORS gets back
every penny it has spent before Mr. Latham gets a dime.
The governing statutes and interpreting caselaw are in agreement: state Medicaid
agencies can dig their hands into Medicaid recipients' settlement pools only when very
specific limitations are observed. ORS failed to either ensure apportionment of settlement
funds or to ascertain the extent of third-party liability for the payments ORS made on Mr.
Latham's behalf. An attempted "recovery" that fails to observe those limitations violates
federal Medicaid law and strips a Medicaid recipient of his or her property.

II.

A state Medicaid agency cannot obtain "reimbursement" from the portion of a
settlement allocated for future medical care.
In the second section of its brief, ORS argues that when state Medicaid agencies seek

"reimbursement" from a Medicaid recipient's settlement with a liable third party, the
agency should "be allowed to recover its past medical expenses from the portion of the

8
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settlement that represented future medical expenses." See Appellee's Br. 14 (emphasis
~

added). ORS's argument on this point is sparse. ORS insists, for example, that in Medicaidrecovery disputes "all medical expenses are treated .as part of a single amount and are not
separated into past and future amounts." Id. at 13. In support of this blanket assertion, ORS
offers only two notes: ( 1) "[n]either Ahlborn nor Wos treated medical care expenses as two
· separate amounts, past and future," id. at 14; and (2) two cases-one Florida District Court
of Appeals case and an Idaho Supreme Court case-have permitted Medicaid recovery
"from any portion of a third-party s~ttlement," while (in ORS's view) the "contrary cases
presented by Mr. Latham" are not "persuasive," see id. at 15-16. As the sections below
demonstrate, both arguments miss the mark.
A.

Ahlborn and Wos offer no support for ORS's position.

With respect to Ahlborn. and Wos, ORS takes the same misleading position on appeal
that it took below: because the Supreme Court "never used the phrase 'past medical
expenses' in its holding[s]," those two cases should be read to endorse the proposition that
state Medicaid agencies be allowed to recover Medicaid-covered past medical costs from
the portion of a settlement allocated for future medical expenses. See id. at 14-16; see also
R00l00-104.
A careful look at Ahlborn and Wos vitiates this position. As the Supreme Court's
Ahlborn decision states explicitly, when Ahlborn ·med suit against the two alleged

tortfeasors with whom she eventually reached a settlement, Ahlborn "claimed damages not
only for past medical costs, but also_ for ... future medical expenses." Ahlborn, 54 7 U.S.
at 273. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the Arkansas Medicaid agency
had already abandoned any idea of pursuing recovery from the pool of "future medical
expenses." The sole question before the Ahlborn Court was whether the agency could
recover anything more than the "portion of the judgment that represented payments for
medical care" that Medicaid had already provided, and the Court concluded that the agency
could recover nothing more. See id. at 274-7 5.
9
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Cansler, the Fourth Circuit decision affirmed by the Supreme Court in Wos,

reinforces this point. 4 In applying Ahlborn and the implementing federal statutes, the
Cansler court was insistent and emphatic about whether state Medicaid agencies could

reach into the portion of a settlement set aside for future medical expenses:
• "The [Ahlborn] Court concluded that the federal third-party liability
provisions require an assignment of no more than the right to recover the
portion of the settlement proceeds which are designated for past medical bills
paid by Medicaid." 674 F.3d 290, 300 (4th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added).
• "Ahlborn is properly understood to prohibit recovery by the state of niore
than the amount of settlement proceeds representing payment for medical
care already received." Id. at 307 (emphasis added).

• "As the unanimous Ahlborn Court's decision makes clear, federal Medicaid
law limits a state's recovery to settlement proceeds that are shown to be
properly allocable to past medical expenses." Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
The Wos Court fully affirmed Cansler, concluding that the North Carolina statute at issue
violated the Medicaid anti-lien provision. See 568 U.S. 627, 644 (2013). Nothing in the
Wos decision can credibly be read to reverse the "past medical expenses" limitation

imposed on at least three occasions by the Cansler court. 5
Furthermore, as explained in Section I.A above, a recent legislative back-and-forth
confirms that a state Medicaid agency's recovery must be limited to portions of its own
past payments for which a third party is liable. (That is, the state Medicaid agency is first
4

Cansler and Wos are the same case. Lanier M. Cansler was the Secretary of the North
Carolina Department of Health and Human Services and, in the official capacity, the
defendant-appellee in the Cansler case before the Fourth Circuit. See E.MA. ex rel. Plyler
v. Cansler, 674 F.3d 290 (4th Cir. 2012). When Aldona Wos replaced Cansler as North
Carolina's HHS Secretary in 2013, the case caption changed accordingly. See Wos v.
E.MA. ex rel. Plyler, 568 U.S. 627 (2013).
5

Before the district court, ORS argued that by not reiterating the Fourth Circuit's
limitations regarding past medical costs, the Supreme Court implicitly overturned those
limitations. See R00102 (arguing that Wos "implicitly rejected" the Fourth Circuit's "past
medical expenses language"). Recognizing, perhaps, that this reasoning would upend the
most basic principles of appellate review, ORS has backed away from this unusual position
on appeal. Compare id. with Appellee's Br. 14-15.

10
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limited to recovery of its own past medical payments, and then further limited by the
principle that it can recover those past medical payments only to the extent of the third
party's liability for those payments.) Again, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(H) provides that
when a state Medicaid agency has· paid "for medical assistance in any case where a third
@

party has a_ legal liability to make payment for such assistance," a state may implement
laws under which it may "acquire[] the rights of [the Medicaid recipient] to payment by
any other party for such health care items or services." A change proposed in 2013 would

replace the final italicized words with the phrase "any payments by such third party." Were
that the case, a state Medicaid agency could credibly argue that when it has made medical
payments on behalf of a Medicaid recipient, it could dig into any third-party settlement
funds for its reimbursement. But that change never came into effect. As a result, though
Utah's Medicaid agency did "provide medical assistance" in this case, and though the
settling hospital may have "a legal liability to make payment for such assistance," ORS
can, at most, obtain Mr. Latham' s right to payment "for such health care items or services."
i>

Put more simply, if Medicaid paid medical costs on Mr. Latham's behalf, and if the settling
hospital is at least in part liable for those medical costs already paid by Medicaid, ORS can
seek to recover those past medical costs. 6
Was/Cansler and the governing statutes couldn't be clearer on this point. ORS can't

seek "recovery" or "reimbursement" from a portion of a settlement that's set aside for
future medical costs. In that context, the words "recovery" and "reimbursement" make
almost no sense. ORS can "recover" its payments for past medical care only from the
@

portion of a settlement that has been set aside for Medicaid's own past medical costs.

@

6

Though again, as explained at length above·, ORS is only permitted to recover these past
medical costs to the extent of the settling hospital's liability, and it is ORS's responsibility
to ascertain the extent of the hospital's liability for those costs.
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B.

The overwhelming majority of courts addressing this issue have rejected
the argument ORS advances here.

In its brief, ORS argues that "[s]everal courts" have "permit[ted] Medicaid recovery
from any portion of a third-party settlement or judgment that is identified as for medical
expenses." See Appellee's Br. 15. As a threshold matter, ORS is in no position to "recover[]
from [the] portion of. a third-party settlement ... identified as for medical expenses"
because-as both parties recognize-Mr. Latham's third-party settlement wasn't allocated
between categories in the first place. But even setting that point aside, ORS does not dispute
that the overwhelming majority of courts who have addressed this issue have concluded
that a state Medicaid agency can recovery only from the portion of a third-party settlement
that is specifically attributed to the agency's own past medical expenses.
ORS points to only two cases in support of its view that it should be allowed to
recover from any part of a third-party settlement that is attributable to medical costs, past
or future: Giraldo, a 2017 case from a Florida District Court of Appeals, and In re Matey,
a 2009 Idaho Supreme Court case. As Mr. Latham pointed out in his opening brief, the
Florida case-Giraldo-was contradicted weeks later by another Florida case, this one
called Willoughby. ORS's reliance on Giraldo is further (and irreparably) undercut by the
Florida Supreme Court's recent decision-issued only days ago-reversing the Florida
appellate court's decision in Giraldo. See Giraldo v. Agency for Health Care Admin., --So. 3d ---- (Fla. 2018), available at 2018 WL 3301563.
In its brief opinion, the Florida Supreme Court explained "the plain language of the ·
Medicaid Act" limited the state's "assignment rights (and lien) to settlement funds fairly
allocable to past medical expenses." Id. at *3 (emphasis added). The court recognized
Medicaid's "narrow exception to the anti-lien prohibition," limiting states to "seek
·reimbursement for their Medicaid expenditures by pursuing payment from third parties
legally liable for the recipients' medical expenses." Id. -at *2. The court then analyzed 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(H), noting that the term "such health care items or services" is "most
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. (ij

naturally and reasonably read as referring to those 'health care items or services' already
'furnished' and for which 'payment has been made under the State plan.'" Id. The Giraldo
court saw "no reasonable way to read this language" as giving states a right to assignment
of future medical expenses-i. e., "that portion of a tort recovery from which the injured
party will be expected to pay his or her anticipated medical expenses in the future, without
aid from the government." Id. Put simply, Florida law is now aligned with the cases Mr.
Latham cites in his brief, and one of the two cases ORS relies upon is no longer good law.
Turning to ORS's second supporting case, In re Matey does state that in Ahlborn,
"[t]he [Supreme] [C]ourt made no distinction between damages for past medical care and
those for future medical care." 213 P.3d 389,394 (Idaho 2009); see also Appellee's Br. 16.
But ORS is clearly wrong to suggest-as it does on page 15 of its brief-that In re Matey
interpreted and applied Was/Cansler in addition to Ahlborn. See id. at 15 (suggesting that
In re Matey is one of "[s]everal courts" that have applied "Ahlborn and Wos" in a manner
consistent with ORS's views). That cannot be true, of course, because In re Matey was
~

decided in 2009, while the Fourth Circuit's Cansler decision issued in 2012 and the
Supreme Court's Wos decision issued in 2013.
With that in mind, the Idaho Supreme Court's three-paragraph treatment of the futuremedical-expenses issue is more understandable: parsing only the language of Ahlborn, the
In re Matey court did not find any indication that Ahlborn itself "put [future medical
expenses] off limits to state Medicaid reimbursement claims." See In re Matey, 213 P.3d
at 393-94. 7 Now, nearly a decade later, Was/Cansler and the legislative back-and-forth

7 In

@

re Matey also relied upon an Idaho statute that provided that, under certain conditions,
a state Medicaid agency's claim must "have priority to any amount received from a third
party." See In re Matey, 213 P.3d at 393; Idaho Code § 56-209b(5). Utah has a similar
provision-Utah Code § 26-19-401 ( 1)(b)-but, of course, provisions like this must yield
to the extent they violate federal Medicaid law, a fact that Utah expressly recognizes in
Utah Code § 26-19-605 ("In no event shall any provision contained in this chapter be
applied contrary to existing federal law.").
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surrounding the governing Medicaid statutes 8 have made it much clearer that the portion
of a third-party settlement set aside for future medical expenses is, in fact, off limits to state
Medicaid agencies.
With respect to the cases supporting Mr. Latham's position-including Cansler and

In re E.B., 729 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 2012), a thoughtful and well-reasoned West Virginia
Supreme Court decision from 2012-ORS has little to say, other than to suggest that these
courts "do[] not explain" their reasoning to ORS's satisfaction. See Appellee's Br. 16-17.
The most critical take-away, however, is that the issues in this case can't be resolved by
popular vote among the courts who have weighed in-though it certainly appears that that
vote would come out in Mr. Latham's favor. Instead, these issues must be resolved through
reference to the governing federal statutes.
Those federal laws require a decision in Mr. Latham's favor here. Recovery by state
Medicaid agencies is a narrow exception to the anti-lien provisions of federal Medicaid
law. And that narrow exception allows a state Medicaid agency recover only its own past
payments of medical costs and, even then, to recover only the portion of those payments
that is attributable to third-party liability. Absent a stipulation or more formal determination
of that "attribution," the third-party liability here should be set using the formula used in

Ahlborn: the hospital settled $7 .2 million claim for $800,000, implying third-party liability
of just over 11 %. By federal law, ORS can recovery only the portion of its $104,065.32 in
Medicaid payments that is attributable to third-party liability. After adjusting for attorneys'
fees, 11% ofORS's payments is $7,631.46, and ORS's recovery should be capped at that
amount.

III. Restricting ORS's lien to comply with federal law benefits the few and the many.
ORS makes one more argument to buttress its claim that it is entitled to full
reimbursement. It is a public policy argument. According to ORS, if it the Court precludes

8 See

supra Section I.A.
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~

ORS from full recovery, "Medicaid could easily find itself without funds to assist all
Utahns in need of its help." Appellee's Br. 5. But ORS offers no data, expert testimonials,
or congressional reports in support of this claim, nor does ORS suggest that this argument
finds support in the Medicaid statutes, or in Ahlborn or Was/Cansler. It simply casts the
~

specter of a Medicaid system gone bankrupt, with the needy left unassisted and untreated.
Not only does this argument lack legal support, it fails to grapple with the realities of
the State's Medicaid-recovery system_. ORS is not in the business of suing every third party
that might have caused harm to a Medicaid recipient. Instead, ORS enters into collections
agreements with Medicaid recipients-as it did with Mr. Latham-effectively deputizing
the recipient to pursue recovery from the a potentially liable third party. But if a large share
of a Medicaid recipient's damages are medical expenses (which is often the case), why
would a recipient slog through litigation only to turn over the fruits of those efforts to ORS?

If the State structured a qui tam enforcement mechanism through which all (or most) of the
potential recovery ends up in ORS's own pockets, would the State be surprised· when no
<ii>

one signed up to be a plaintiff?
And even if a Medicaid recipient decides that it's worth his or her time to sue a third
party, implementing "a rule of absolute priority" in favor of the State "might preclude
settlement in a large number of cases." Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 288. If the State's settlement
share is not reduced in proportion to the reduction endured by the Medicaid recipient-if,
in other words, ORS is allowed to gobble up the lion's share of the settlement-why would

a

any recipient agree to a settlement at all? Why not roll the dice at jury trial?
<i

Limiting ORS' s recovery to past medical expenses attributable to third-party liability
not only complies with federal law, it promotes sound public policy. This is especially true
when a settlement is divided using the Ahlborn formula. If ORS and Medicaid recipients
know from the beginning that they will share proportionally in any settlement, they are
more likely to behave as allies instead of adversaries. By maximizing recovery for the
other, they will also maximize recovery for themselves. With that alignment in mind,
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•
proportionality won't bankrupt the State's Medicaid system, it will increase and improve
participation in recovery efforts, which will in turn make the system more efficient and

••

better tailored to its high-level goals.
CONCLUSION
Medicaid recipients don't forfeit their property rights. The recovery rights for state
Medicaid agencies are narrow exceptions to the anti-lien provisions of federal Medicaid
law, and those recovery rights can only be exercised within the bounds set by federal law
and by the Supreme Court cases construing those laws. Two critical limitations apply here.
First, a state Medicaid agency can only recover its own expenditures-it cannot "recover"

•

from a pool of money set aside to pay for a Medicaid recipient's future medical costs. And
second, even in recovering its own expenditures, a state Medicaid agency is obligated by
statute to "ascertain the legal liability of third paiiies" for payments made by Medicaid,

•

and to "seek reimbursement" for those Medicaid payments only "to the extent of such legal
liability." ORS failed to ascertain third-party liability in this case. Given that failure, the
most practical and cost-efficient approach was to use the Ahlborn formula to approximate

•

third-party liability. The district court should have done so below-and the district court
e1Ted when it failed to properly limit ORS's recovery. Mr. Latham therefore asks this Court
to reverse the district court's decision, to use the Ahlborn fonnula to fix third-party liability,
and to limit ORS's recovery out of Mr. Latham's third-party settlement to $7,631.46.

•

Dated: July 11, 2018.
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SUPPLEMENTAL ADDENDUM
In accordance with Rule 24(a)(l2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Mr.
Latham includes in this Supplemental Addendum copies of the following:
(1)

(Corrected) Selections of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25) (beginning on p.SA~2)
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§ 1396a. State plans for medical assistance, 42 USCA § 1396a

United States Code Annotated
Title 42. The Public Health and Welfare
Chapter 7. Social Security (Refs &Annos)
Subchapter XIX. Grants to States for Medical Assistance Programs (Refs & Annos)

42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a
§ 1396a. State plans for medical assistance

Currentness

(a)Contents
Iii)

A State plan for medical assistance must--

Qt
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§ 1396a. State plans for medical assistance, 42 USCA § 1396a

provide information needed to determine payments due under this chapter on account of care and services furnished
to individuals;

(25) provide--

(A) that the State or local agency administering such plan will take all reasonable measures to ascertain the legal
liability of third parties (including health insurers, self-insured plans, group health plans (as defined in section 607(1)
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1167(1)]), service benefit plans, managed care
organizations, pharmacy benefit managers, or other parties that are, by statute, contract, or agreement, legally
responsible for payment of a claim for a health care item or service) to pay for care and services available under
the plan, including--

(i) the collection of sufficient information (as specified by the Secretary in regulations) to enable the State to

pursue claims against such third parties, with such information being collected at the time of any determination
or redetermination of eligibility for medical assistance, and

(ii) the submission to the Secretary of a plan (subject to approval by the Secretary) for pursuing claims against
such third parties, which plan shall be integrated with, and be monitored as a part of the Secretary's review of,
the State's mechanized claims processing and information retrieval systems required under section 1396b(r) of
this title;

(B) that in any case where such a legal liability is found to exist after medical assistance has been made available on
behalf of the individual and where the amount of reimbursement the State can reasonably expect to recover exceeds
the costs of such recovery, the State or local agency will seek reimbursement for such assistance to the extent of
such legal liability;

(C) that in the case of an individual who is entitled to medical assistance under the State plan with respect to a
service for which a third party is liable for payment, the person furnishing the service may not seek to collect from
the individual (or any financially responsible relative or representative of that individual) payment of an amount
for that service (i) if the total of the amount of the liabilities of third parties for that service is at least equal to the
amount payable for that service under the plan (disregarding section 13960 of this title), or (ii) in an amount which
exceeds the lesser of (I) the amount which may be collected under section 13960 of this title, or (II) the amount by
which the amount payable for that service under the plan (disregarding section 13960 of this title), exceeds the total
. of the amount of the liabilities of third parties for that service;
<if)

(D) that a person who furnishes services and is participating under the plan may not refuse to furnish services to an
individual (who is entitled to have payment made under the plan for the services the person furnishes) because of
a third party's potential liability for payment for the service;

(E) that in the case of preventive pediatric care (including early and periodic screening and diagnosis services under.
section 1396d(a)(4)(B) of this title) covered under the State plan, the State shall--
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§ 1396a. State plans for medical assistance, 42 USCA § 1396a

(i) make payment for such service in accordance with the usual payment schedule under such plan for such services
without regard to the liability of a third party for payment for such services; and

(ii) seek reimbursement from such third party in accordance with subparagraph (B);

(F) that in the case of any services covered under such plan which are provided to an individual on whose behalf
child support ~nforcement is being carried out by the State agency under part D of subchapter IV of this chapter,
the State shall--

(i) make payment for such service in accordance with the usual payment schedule under such plan for such services

without regard to any third-party liability for payment for such services, if such third-party liability is derived
(through insurance or otherwise) from the parent whose obligation to pay support is being enforced by such
agency, if payment has not been made by such third party within 30 days after such services are furnished; and

(ii) seek reimbursement from such third party in accordance with subparagraph (B);

(G) that the State prohibits any health insurer (including a group health plan, as defined in section 607(1) of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 [29 US.C.A. 1167(1)], a self-insured plan, a service benefit plan,
a managed care organization, a pharmacy benefit manager, or other party that is, by statute, contract, or agreement,
legally responsible for payment of a claim for a health care item or service), in enrolling an individual or in making
any payments for benefits to the individual or on the individual's behalf, from taking into account that the individual
is eligible for or is provided medical assistance under a plan under this subchapter for such State, or any other State;

(H) that to the extent that payment has been made under the State plan for medical assistance in any· case where
a third party has a legal liability to make payment for such assistance, the State has in effect laws under which, to
the extent that payment has been made under the State plan for medical assistance for health care items or services
furnished to an individual, the State is considered to have acquired the rights of such individual to payment by any
other party for such health care items or services; and

(I) that the State shall provide assurances satis~actory to the Secretary that the State has in effect laws requiring

~

health insurers, including self-insured plans, group health plans (as defined in section 607(1) of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 [29 U.S.C.A. 1167(1)]), service benefit plans, managed care organizations,
pharmacy benefit managers, or other parties that are, by statute, contract, or agreement, legally responsible for
payment of a claim for a health care item or service, as a condition of doing business in the State, to--

(i) provide, with respect to individuals who are eligible (and, at State option, individuals who apply or whose
eligibility for medical assistance is being evaluated in accordance with subsection (e)(l3)(D) of this section) for,
or are provided, medical assistance under a State plan (or under a waiver of the plan) under this subchapter and
child health assistance under subchapter XXI, upon the request of the State, information to determine during
what period the individual or their spouses or their dependents may be (or may have been) covered by a health
insurer and the nature of the coverage that is or was provided by the health insurer (including the name, address,
and identifying number of the plan) in a manner prescribed by the Secretary;
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§ 1396a. State plans for medical assistance, 42 USCA § 1396a

(ii) accept the State's right of recovery and the assignment to the State of any right of an individual or other entity
to payment from the party_ for an item or service for which payment has been made under the State plan;

(iii) respond to any inquiry by the State regarding a claim for payment for any health care item or service that is
submitted not later than 3 years after the date of the provision of such health care item or service; and

(iv) agree not to deny a claim submitted by the State solely on the basis of the date of submission of the claim,
the type or format of the claim form, or a failure to present proper documentation at the point-of-sale that is
the basis of the claim, if--

(I) the claim is submitted by the State within the 3-year period beginning on the date on which the item or
service was furnished; and

(II) any action by the State to enforce its rights with respect to such claim is commenced within 6 years of the
State's submission of such claim;
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